This article argues that the international financial consequences of immigration exert a substantial influence on the choice of exchange rate regimes in the developing world. Over the past two decades, migrant remittances have emerged as a significant source of external finance for developing countries, often exceeding conventional sources of capital such as foreign direct investment and bank lending. Remittances are unlike nearly all other capital flows in that they are stable and move countercyclically relative to the recipient country's economy. As a result, they mitigate the costs of forgone domestic monetary policy autonomy and also serve as an international risk-sharing mechanism for developing countries. The observable implication of these arguments is that remittances increase the likelihood that policymakers adopt fixed exchange rates. An analysis of data on de facto exchange rate regimes and a newly available dataset on remittances for up to 74 developing countries from 1982 to 2006 provides strong support for these arguments; the results are robust to instrumental variable analysis and the inclusion of multiple economic and political variables.
Governments in developing countries have long realized that migrant remittances are a significant source of external finance. Remittances-which arise when migrants send money back home to their families-are an important lifeline for some of the poorest countries in the world, but also constitute a sizable share of GDP for emergingmarket countries. In countries such as El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, and Jordan, inflows of remittances exceed 15 percent of GDP. In 2004, a total of 42 developing countries had remittances inflows greater than 5 percent of GDP.
1 The World Bank estimates that total recorded flows of remittances reached $318 billion in 2007; this is a staggering sum that dwarfs other external financial sources, such as official development assistance, bank lending, and private investment. Annual flows of remittances even exceed foreign direct investment (FDI) for the majority of developing countries.
Remittances pose a challenge to our understanding of the influence of global finance on national policy choices in the developing world. Indeed, as a form of capital inflow, remittances have many unusual characteristics. Most strikingly, they are "unrequited": they do not result in claims on assets, debt service obligations, or other contractual obligations (Brown 2006; Kapur 2005) . In contrast to purchases of financial or productive assets, which can be liquidated and repatriated, remittances cannot be withdrawn from a country ex post. They therefore cannot be lumped together with other capital flows that arguably cause household insecurity or income volatility, such as foreign direct investment and portfolio flows (e.g., Garrett 1998; Scheve and Slaughter 2004) , or with financial capital that can be withdrawn by investors as a form of punishment for unfriendly government policies (Mosley 2000 (Mosley , 2003 Jensen 2006; Li and Resnick 2003) . Moreover, migrants tend to increase their remittances when their 1 Data from World Bank, various years.
countries of origin experience economic difficulties. As a result, remittances smooth the incomes of families and shield policymakers from the vagaries of the global economy. In short, financial transfers from migrants are a form of insurance for developing countries against exogenous shocks (Kapur 2005; Lopez-Cordova and Olmedo 2005; Lucas and Stark 1985; Rapoport and Docquier 2005; Yang and Choi 2007) .
What are the implications for national policymaking when cross-border financial transfers within families emerge as a prominent force in the global economy? The prominence of remittances has potentially profound implications for a variety of national policy choices. This article focuses on exchange rate policy, which is arguably the most important macroeconomic policy domain for governments in developing countries (Cooper 1999) . Indeed, the exchange rate is the most important price in an open economy, as it affects the price of all other goods and services.. As with most economic policy choices, exchange rate policy entails important trade-offs (Bernhard and Leblang 1999; Cohen 1993; Frieden 1991; Leblang 1999; Walter 2008) . Policymakers choose fixed rates to facilitate international trade and investment and provide an anchor for monetary policy, but they lose the ability to adjust monetary policy to changing domestic circumstances-an ability commonly dubbed "domestic monetary policy autonomy." Policymakers select floating rates to retain the ability to adjust interest rates in reaction to exogenous shocks or economic downturns, but they incur costs in terms of increased uncertainty in international economic relationships and greater difficulty in anchoring expectations about inflation.
This article argues that remittances enter the political calculus of exchange rate policymaking, along with political institutions, interest groups, and other political economy considerations. Remittances mitigate the political costs of lost monetary policy autonomy because they react countercyclically to economic downturns and otherwise insulate policymakers from the ups and downs of the economic cycle. In essence, remittances have the capacity to substitute (albeit imperfectly) for domestic monetary policy autonomy in the developing world. Therefore, I expect inflows of remittances to be positively associated with the implementation of fixed exchange rates. I develop this argument using conventional macroeconomic models in unconventional ways. Using Robert Mundell's (1961) optimum currency area framework, I argue that migrant remittances serve a similar function as centralized fiscal transfers (or other supraregional risk-sharing mechanisms) in allowing the domestic economy to adjust to a fixed exchange rate.
The article proceeds as follows. I begin with an overview of remittances in the global economy, including trends, causes, and consequences. I also summarize the ample evidence of the countercyclicality of remittance flows. I then provide an empirical test of the hypothesis that remittances, along with interest group pressures, political institutions, and macroeconomic conditions, are important determinants of exchange rate regimes in the developing world. Using newly available World Bank data on annual remittances from 1982-2006 for up to 74 developing countries, I demonstrate that countries for which remittances constitute a substantial share of GDP are more likely to adopt fixed exchange rates. This finding is of particular significance given the recent ideological shift against fixed rates: it appears that remittances encourage policymakers to go against the tide.
The findings are robust to multiple model specifications, including de facto and de jure measures of exchange rate policy. I also account for possible endogeneity by using migrant flows to wealthy countries as an instrumental variable for remittances. The article concludes with a discussion of the broader implications of remittances for the political economy of national policymaking in a global economy.
REMITTANCES: DEFINITIONS, TRENDS, AND CONSEQUENCES
International financial transfers from migrants to family members in their home countries are known as remittances. A typical remittance transaction contains two parts:
first, the migrant contracts with an agent-either a money service business such as Western Union, a bank, or an informal agent-and transmits the money to the agent via cash, check, credit card, or other debit instruction; and second, the agent instructs its own affiliate in the receiving country to deliver the remittance to the beneficiary (Ratha 2005a ).
Remittances have experienced strong growth over the past two decades.
Recorded remittances to developing countries increased from $31.2 billion in 1990 to $160 billion in 2004, and to over $300 billion in 2007. The rate of growth was fastest for "lower middle income countries" (with approximate GDP per capita between $1,000 and $3,500), a category that includes countries such as El Salvador, Indonesia, and Tunisia.
The growth in remittances is particularly striking in comparison to portfolio investment (private debt and equity), which declined by 20 percent between 1995 and 2004, and official development assistance, which increased by a modest 34 percent over the same period. The result of these trends is that remittances are second only to FDI as a source of external capital flows in the developing world ( Figure 1 It is a misconception that remittances flow only to very poor countries. Perhaps surprisingly, in 2004, France, Spain, and Belgium were among the ten largest recipients of remittances. Among developing countries, more than 70 percent of total remittances accrue to those in the "middle-income" bracket, including China, Honduras, and Peru.
Nevertheless, for poor countries such as Mongolia, Nepal, and the Gambia, remittances frequently constitute more than 10 percent of GDP and thus are a critical lifeline for the resident population (see Figure 2) . (Brown 2006; Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah 2005; Durrand and Massey 1992; Glytsos 1993) . Migrants might also send money back home for self-interested reasons, such as to maintain or expand existing investments (businesses, land, etc.) that they left behind, or to repay loans. Some scholars have argued that ostensibly self-interested motivations can be subsumed under the rubrics of "enlightened selfishness" or "impure altruism" because remittances are transmitted between individuals with strong familial (i.e., non-financial) ties (Lucas and Stark 1985; Andreoni 1989 ).
Figure 2 about here

Causes and Consequences
There is a substantial literature on the poverty-reducing impact of remittances, which is largely beyond the scope of this article. 4 However, the "multiplier effects" of remittances deserve special mention here. Inflows of remittances generally contribute more than their initial value to the receiving economy (Orozco 2004; Ratha 2005b) . One study of the Mexican economy found that each remitted dollar generates four dollars in demand for goods and services (Durrand, Parrado, and Massey 1986 ). An important implication of the multiplier effect is that households that do not receive remittances still benefit indirectly from remittances to other households. For example, construction workers, timber producers, and day laborers benefit if remittances are used for home building (Kapur 2005) . Even remittances to rural and remote areas have a broader economic impact, as the secondary beneficiaries of these capital inflows include goods and labor markets in urban areas (Zarate-Hoyos 2004) .
Countercyclical Remittance Inflows
Remittances are transfers between families that tend to flow countercyclically relative to the recipient country's economy (World Bank 2006; Frankel 2009 Kapur (2005, 343) defines a downturn as a decline in GDP of 2 percent or greater.
responsiveness of remittances to hurricane Gilbert in Jamaica in 1988. Given these articles' focus on natural disasters as the trigger for remittances, there is no concern over endogeneity. Yang and Choi (2007) are also sensitive to endogeneity in examining how remittances respond to household income shocks in the Philippines. Using rainfall shocks as an instrumental variable, they find that 60 percent of household income contractions are replaced by remittance inflows.
Remittances are unusual in their tendency to mitigate economic volatility (Frankel 2009) . A large-sample study conducted by the IMF found that remittances substantially Many scholars believe that countries require some form of insulation from global financial markets, such as welfare state spending, a larger government, or some other form of redistribution (Garrett 1998; Katzenstein 1985; Rodrik 1998; Ruggie 1982; Scheve and Slaughter 2007) . If, however, remittances can serve as a form of insulation rather than a source of insecurity or volatility, then political economy models should pay careful attention to the unique influences of remittances on policymaking.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES
The analytical heart of the literature on the political economy of exchange rates is the Mundell-Fleming model and its famous implication that countries must choose to forgo one of three policy goals: exchange rate stability, full capital mobility, or domestic monetary policy autonomy (Mundell 1960; Fleming 1962) . In today's world of highly integrated financial markets, a discrepancy between the domestic and world interest rates causes capital to flow in the direction of the higher return. If the exchange rate is allowed to float, it will adjust accordingly-appreciating with capital inflows and depreciating with capital outflows. However, if the exchange rate is fixed, then the interest-rate differential is quickly arbitraged away by the capital flows. The result is that the combination of mobile capital and a fixed exchange rate renders monetary policy ineffective as a policy tool.
The Mundell-Fleming conditions imply that governments face a trade-off between credibility and flexibility (Bernhard, Broz, and Clark 2002; Frankel 1999; Bearce 2007) .
Credibility arises from the fixed exchange rate, which decreases transaction costs for investors, traders, and other groups with ties to the global economy (Frieden 2002) .
Reducing or eliminating exchange rate volatility can facilitate international borrowing and stabilize the real value of debts denominated in foreign currencies (Calvo and Reinhart 2002; Walter 2008) . A fixed rate also leads to monetary stability by tying the hands of monetary policymakers (Giavazzi and Pagano 1988) . Businesses and the publicat-large moderate their wage and price expectations because they believe the primary goal of monetary policy is to maintain the exchange rate parity (Canavan and Tommasi 1997; Keefer and Stasavage 2002) . Countries with high inflation are therefore especially interested in the credibility-enhancing features of a fixed exchange rate. However, at the most fundamental level, a fixed exchange rate requires the government to subordinate domestic concerns-whether political or economic-in favor of international concerns (Frieden 2006; Simmons 1994) . Often this implies that the government must sacrifice short-term economic growth and employment levels to preserve the exchange rate.
Moreover, rigidly fixed exchange rates may be prone to speculative attack, thereby undermining the currency stability they were designed to provide. The institutional influences on exchange rate policy can be culled from the emerging literature on exchange rate regime determination. Existing scholarship argues that the degree of democracy is positively associated with floating exchange rates, because leaders in democratic countries face pressures from constituents to use monetary policy for domestic adjustment purposes (Bernhard and Leblang 1999; Leblang 1999 ).
Broz (2002) further argues that democracies, which benefit from greater political transparency than non-democracies, can guard the credibility of their monetary policymaking process without tying their hands with a fixed exchange rate. Other scholars examine the relative political costs of enduring the often painful domestic adjustments required to maintain a fixed exchange rate, which are arguably lower in stable governments and those with small numbers of veto players (Edwards 1999; Simmons 1994; Keefer and Stasavage 2002) . Finally, focusing on developed democracies, studies such as Clark (2002), Clark and Hallerberg (2000) , and Hallerberg (2002) examine the trade-off between fiscal and monetary policy discretion within the Mundell-Fleming framework. They note that fixed exchange rates enhance the power of fiscal policy when capital is fully mobile. Governments are therefore more likely to adopt fixed exchange rates when fiscal policy, rather than monetary policy, is the most effective tool for electoral gain, as in OECD multiparty coalition states where targeted spending can be rewarded by voters (Hallerberg 2002) .
Groups in society that benefit from stable currency relations with other countries, such as exporters and certain investors, can be expected to use their political influence to press for exchange-rate stability (Frieden 1991 (Bernhard and Leblang 1999; Leblang 1997 Leblang , 1999 ). Financial openness, on the other hand, makes the adoption of fixed exchange rates less attractive and therefore less likely.
of exchange rates does not imply an abandonment of the Mundell-Fleming conditions. Indeed, mobile capital will respond to differential rates of return even in countries that are heavily dependent on remittances. However, I argue that such countries will be less concerned about forgoing domestic monetary policy autonomy. Consider the impact of an increase in remittances during a recession in the receiving country. Households use the funds to bolster their consumption of food and basic necessities, and to maintain existing small businesses and other investments. Such spending and investment has a multiplier effect on the economy, triggering additional investment and consumer spending. In short, remittances-when sufficiently large in relation to the economy-constitute an automatic stabilizer that performs a similar function to countercyclical monetary policy.
As such, remittances stand apart from other capital flows in that they do not exacerbate the trade-off between fixed exchange rates and domestic monetary policy autonomy. To be clear, remittances are not a panacea for economic instability: they are unlikely to prevent recessions or to respond with enough force to allow a country to sustain a fixed rate in the face of a massive speculative attack. The argument is simply that remittance inflows make it less costly for countries to adopt fixed rates.
Although exchange-rate models as applied by political economists are limited by their stylized view of capital mobility, Mundell's optimum currency area (OCA) criteria in fact provide a useful, if inadvertent, perspective on the importance of remittances (Mundell 1961 labor mobility within the union should be high enough to allow workers in adversely affected regions to relocate to more favorable employment environments; and second, the currency union itself should have a system of "risk sharing"-usually defined as fiscal transfers-to respond to local shocks, just as the U.S. federal government sends emergency funds to States in times of crisis.
The OCA criteria are rarely realized in practice, especially for developing countries that anchor their currencies to the Euro, the U.S. dollar, or other developedcountry currencies. Shocks to developed and developing economies are likely to be asymmetric, and labor mobility is rarely high enough to be an effective short-term stabilizer. On the issue of risk sharing, however, many developing countries depend on remittances to offset economic downturns. Remittances are not "fiscal transfers" per se, as no central government has the power to direct them to countries in need. Yet they do enable countries to cede some of the risks of forgone monetary policy autonomy to migrants, who in turn remit funds to their families in countercyclical fashion.
The previous discussion sets the stage for an empirical analysis of exchange rate policy in the developing world. The existing literature has emphasized the political and economic factors that determine how policymakers reconcile the trade-off between credibility and flexibility, but has neglected the role of remittances in tilting the balance in favor of fixed exchange rates. To be clear, remittances are not dispositive for policymakers: they ease the political costs of tying their hands with a fixed rate, but other political economy factors will weigh heavily in a policymaker's decision calculus. A complete political economy model must therefore incorporate a range of political and institutional variables that determine how policymakers address the trade-offs of exchange rate regime choice, while incorporating the role of remittances as a determinant of the severity of those trade-offs.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
To assess the political economy of exchange rate regimes in the developing world, I assembled a time-series cross-sectional dataset with annual observations on up to 74 developing countries from 1982-2006. 11 The hypothesis to be tested is that remittance inflows increase the probability that a country will choose to fix its exchange rate, controlling for a variety of political, economic, and institutional mechanisms. The dependent variable is the de facto exchange rate regime, coded as a four-category ordinal variable based on data from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) . Higher values indicate greater degrees of exchange rate flexibility. 12 Unlike de jure classifications based on official 11 The sample is unbalanced, and the limited availability of data on some of the covariates decreases the sample size as noted in the tables. The sample excludes countries that were members of the OECD by 1973. 12 The categories are: 1 = fixed, including traditional peg, currency board, no separate legal tender, and preannounced horizontal band of less than +/-2 percent; 2 = crawling peg or band; 3 = managed floating, including crawling bands wider than +/-2 percent; and 4 = free floating. See Reinhart and Rogoff 2004. I government policy, these de facto measures of exchange rate regimes are derived from a combination of foreign reserve activity, parallel market exchange rates, and extensive country chronologies (Reinhart and Rogoff 2004) . They therefore capture the actual operation of the exchange rate regime over time. In the robustness section, I employ an alternative measure of the dependent variable based on the IMF's de jure classification.
The percentage of countries in the world with de facto fixed exchange rates has remained relatively stable since 1980, hovering around 45 percent. However, there has been a steady decline in the number of countries with de jure fixed exchange rates, arguably reflecting a shifting "climate of ideas" in favor of floating exchange rates in the developing world (Collins 1996) . Between 1980 and 1995, the percentage of countries with fixed exchange rates fell dramatically from 70 percent to less than 30 percent . 13 I use these data with a degree of caution. World Bank researchers are able to estimate only the officially recorded inward remittances for each country-year, not the flows through unofficial channels, such as the hawala system and other informal value transfer systems. As discussed earlier, recorded flows have risen substantially in recent discard country-years in currency crisis (i.e., "freely falling" currencies) and those with "dual markets" with missing parallel market data. 13 The measure includes funds classified as "workers' remittances." times, and a portion of this increase may be attributable to a shift from unofficial to official transmission channels, rather than an increase in remittances per se. The World Bank attempts to mitigate this problem by using estimates from its own country desks or from national central banks when official balance-of-payments statistics are missing or of questionable construction. Nevertheless, unofficial flows remain outside the scope of the dataset. I return to this issue in the robustness section below.
A cursory overview of the data suggests that remittances are highly correlated with exchange rate regime outcomes. Using the sample in Model 1 (described below), the mean level of remittances for countries with fixed exchange rates is 7.9 percent of GDP, whereas the mean for countries with floating rates is 3.5 percent of GDP. 
s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions, and focuses on four dimensions of restrictions: the existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on the current and capital accounts (where the latter are measured as the proportion of the last five years without controls), and requirements to surrender export proceeds. 15 The index has a mean of zero and ranges from -2.66 (full capital controls) to 2.66 (complete liberalization). Based on prior scholarship, capital account openness should be negatively associated with the adoption of fixed rates.
However, the OCA framework suggests that countries with more open capital accounts should be more likely to adopt fixed exchange rates, as high levels of financial integration can generate strong domestic support for stable cross-border financial relationships.
Model 1 includes a measure of democracy based on the Polity IV database (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 2006). The variable ranges from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic). Following and Leblang (1999) , I expect this variable to be positively associated with floating. The rate of inflation (lagged one period) is included with the expectation that high-inflation countries choose a fixed rate as an anchor for monetary policy. 16 The level of foreign currency reserves (as a ratio of months of imports) reflects the resources available to the central bank to intervene in foreign exchange markets. Also included are the current account balance as a share of GDP and terms-of-trade volatility. 17 Policymakers in countries with current account imbalances and volatile trading patterns face incentives to allow the currency to float. Finally, the model includes the level of economic development (GDP per capita) and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after 1998 for any country that has joined the European Union during the sample period. This coding scheme accounts for the external pressure to 15 For a detailed description of this measure, see Chinn and Ito 2006. 16 The sample includes a handful of observations with inflation greater than 100 percent. Results are robust to including a high-inflation dummy, dropping these observations, or using the log of inflation. 17 Terms of trade volatility is measured as the standard deviation in the terms of trade in year t, t-1, and t-2.
maintain a stable parity with the Euro as a prerequisite to joining the EU and ultimately the Eurozone. authority (PITF 2001) . 19 It provides another indicator of the ability of the government to maintain a fixed exchange rate. However, as Edwards (1996) notes, greater instability increases the costs of abandoning a peg and therefore reduces the ex ante probability that a peg will be chosen; on the other hand, instability makes decision makers less concerned about the costs of reneging on an exchange rate commitment in the future. The manufacturing indicator provides a more fine-grained interest group indicator alongside the more general measure of a country's export dependence. Frieden et al (2001) find that large manufacturing sectors are associated with floating exchange rates, but it is possible that this finding is limited to the high-inflation Latin American countries in which fixed exchange rates were historically associated with an anti-competitive appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, I estimate the models using ordered probit with standard errors clustered on country. A lagged dependent variable is included to account for the temporal sluggishness of exchange rate policy. 20 Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1 . Table 2 presents the regression results.
The sample for Model 1 consists of 992 country-year observations with 73 developing countries; the sample size is reduced to 824 observations and 70 countries for Model 2 due to the limited availability of the additional covariates.
21 19 The PITF database records the beginning and ending years of the adverse regime change. The variable "Political Crisis" can therefore range from 0 to 100 percent, depending on the status of the country in the prior five years. 20 Results for Models 1 and 2 are substantively unchanged if year fixed effects are included. 21 For all models, I exclude the countries in the CFA Franc zones in Africa, as their inclusion as independent observations is questionable in light of the prominent role of French central bank in their monetary affairs. See, e.g., Stasavage 1997. Moreover, their inclusion in the sample could bias the results in favor of my argument, as they are coded as fixed exchange rate regimes with relatively high levels of remittances. Lesotho is also dropped from the sample because of its extraordinary leverage over the results as a fixed rate country with remittance inflows that often exceed 75 percent of GDP. Panama, a country that adopted the U.S. dollar more than 100 years ago, is also dropped to avoid biasing the results. Table 1 and Table 2 here
The results from Models 1 and 2 support the hypothesis that inward remittances are associated with fixed exchange rate regimes in developing countries. The coefficient for remittances is negative and statistically significant. (Recall that lower values of the dependent variable imply greater degrees of exchange rate fixity.) This result is robust to the inclusion of political, institutional, and OCA-related macroeconomic variables. In both models, inflation is negatively signed and significant, reflecting policymakers' desire to provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy when the domestic price level is unstable. In addition, the coefficient for democracy is positive and significant, which supports the idea that democratically elected leaders are vulnerable to popular pressures to conduct an autonomous monetary policy under a floating exchange rate. Not surprisingly, the lagged dependent variable is highly significant, reflecting the temporal sluggishness of exchange rate policy.
The statistical significance of remittances increases with the additional covariates in Model 2. Capital account openness is negatively signed and significant, indicating an association between financial openness and fixed exchange rates. This is largely in line with Mundell-Fleming expectations; note, however, that simpler measures of capital controls have been shown to be positively associated with floating exchange rates in prior scholarship Leblang 1999 ). However, exports as a share of GDP is not significant, possibly due to the inclusion of manufacturing production as a share of GDP, which is significant and negatively signed. This finding is not consistent with Frieden et al (2001) 's findings for Latin America, but it is theoretically consistent with the notion that manufacturers in the developing world desire stable currency relations with their foreign consumers. The level of reserves is also significant in Model 2, indicating an association between fixed exchange rates and ample supplies of foreign currency. The remaining covariates, including political constraints and government instability, are not significant.
Because the substantive interpretation of ordered probit coefficients is not straightforward, I provide simulations in Figure 4 using estimates from Model 2. 22 The solid line demonstrates how the probability of fixing the exchange rate changes as remittances increase while the other variables are held at their means. The dotted lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. I limit the range of remittances (the X axis) to 0 to 20 percent, although a few countries in the sample have remittances in excess of this level. 23 When remittances increase from 0 to 10 percent of GDP, the probability of fixing the exchange rate increases from 6 percent to 12 percent. For countries with remittances at the high end of the sample range, the probability of fixing exceeds 20 percent. These findings are substantial, especially considering that the model includes a lagged dependent variable which may suppress the impact of the other independent variables (Achen 2000) . Figure 4 here
Robustness
There are a number of additional variables whose inclusion in the model could be theoretically justified. The following variables were added to Model 2 as robustness checks; none altered the statistical significance of remittances. As expected, a measure of 22 Simulations conducted using CLARIFY (Tomz et al 2003) . 23 Lesotho receives remittances in excess of 80 percent in certain years; the results are robust to dropping Lesotho from the sample.
partisanship (coded as a left or center-right dummy variable) was not significant. 24 The inclusion of a measure of central bank independence reduced the sample size to just 35 countries, but it was in fact significant and negative. 25 It is possible that policymakers in developing countries are more likely to adopt fixed rates to "tie the hands" of central bankers who might not share their monetary policy preferences (O'Mahony 2008) . Some scholars argue that countries that wish to stabilize the real value of their foreign debt service payments will prefer fixed exchange rates (e.g., Shambaugh 2004; von Hagen and Zhou 2006; Walter 2008) . A measure of total external debt, however, was not significant. Finally, foreign aid could condition the choice of exchange rate regime if policymakers feel that it is a reliable source of foreign exchange, especially in times of economic downturn. To test this hypothesis, I included a measure of foreign aid as a percentage of GDP. Not surprisingly, it was not significant. Foreign aid is not a reliable capital inflow for most countries, and it is frequently tied to policy adjustments and other conditions. It is therefore not surprising that it does not have the same impact on exchange rate regime choices as remittances.
In addition, I tested the robustness of the findings to using the IMF's de jure exchange rate regime classification as the dependent variable. 26 Since the beginning of the post-War period, the IMF has required member countries to make official announcements of their exchange rate regimes. Article IV, Section 2 of the IMF's Articles of Agreement grants the IMF the responsibility for exercising "firm surveillance" over the exchange rate policies of members, which it has used to publish its regarding exchange rate policy (Collins 1996 ; see also , Frieden et al 2001 , and Simmons 1994 . This measure also captures the trend away from de jure fixed exchange rates for developing countries (see Figure 3 ). As shown in Table 2 , Model 3, the coefficient for remittances remains statistically significant and negatively signed.
Because the ordered probit model is limited in its ability to account for crosscountry heterogeneity 27 , I transformed the dependent variable into a binary measure and estimated a logit model with country fixed effects. 28 This conditional logit model accounts for unobserved cross-country variation, including inter alia the degree of correlation between the economic cycles of the remitting and receiving countries, the cultural motivations for remitting, and other time-invariant characteristics of countries.
29
It should be noted that exchange rate regimes and remittance levels as a share of GDP are relatively slow to change over time for many countries, and therefore the fixed effects model provides a particularly strenuous test. Nevertheless, the coefficient for remittances remains negative and significant, although the sample size is reduced to 28 countries (434 27 Fixed-effects ordered probit models do not provide consistent estimates. 28 The binary variable is calculated from the four categories discussed earlier: regimes coded as 1 or 2 take the value of 0 (fixed), and those coded 3 or 4 take the value of 1 (floating). As in the previous analyses, regimes coded as 5 or 6 are discarded. 29 On the insensitivity of remittances to the sending country's business cycle, see Roache and Gradzka 2007. observations) due to the fixed effects estimator. 30 Results are included in Table 3 , Model 4.
31 Table 3 about here Finally, as mentioned earlier, it is not controversial to state that remittances data suffer from measurement error. The goal of the empirical models discussed above is to subject the data to rigorous analysis, and to ensure that any inherent biases in favor of the argument are adequately addressed. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the analyses, as the remittances data only reflect the information that governments are able to record. This prompts the question: is a country's ability to track and record remittances associated with its exchange rate policy?
It is highly unlikely that better recording capacity is associated with the adoption of fixed exchange rates. Indeed, the opposite case is more likely to hold. A floating exchange rate requires that the central bank conducts an independent monetary policy, which is a highly information-intensive process. Under a floating exchange rate, central banks require detailed models of the economy, frequent financial updates from financial institutions, reliable indicators of the domestic price level and the money supply, and sufficient expertise (by way of governors, economists, and financial analysts) to make appropriate decisions about monetary policy. These are the types of characteristics that are likely to be associated with the ability to track inflows of remittances through the banking sector and through less formal channels. If this is true, the measurement error in 30 Due to the fixed effects estimator, the sample necessarily excludes countries with no temporal variation in the dependent variable. 31 The EU dummy variable is not included in Models 4 or 5, as it makes no discernible impact on the results.
the preceding analyses should make it less likely, rather than more likely, to find a positive association between fixed exchange rates and remittance inflows.
Instrumental Variable Analysis
If migrants take into account exchange-rate instability when deciding whether or not to remit, then the models presented above may be biased due to endogeneity. significant are foreign exchange reserves and the current account balance, in line with expectations. GDP per capita is also significant, possibly reflecting the connection between the availability of human and financial resources and the ability of a government to run an autonomous monetary policy. The polity score and capital account openness, however, are not significant as in the previous models, and the other covariates are also not significant.
CONCLUSION
The rise of remittances has profound implications for the study of international financial relations. As families extend beyond national boundaries through migration, the resulting flow of funds is changing the character of financial market influence on government policymaking. Indeed, the evolution of financial globalization is taking an interesting turn in the developing world. While their developed-country counterparts react to the increasing integration of asset markets and the spread of the multinational corporation, developing countries are also adapting to the international financial consequences of immigration. Remittances from overseas migrants constitute a major source of capital for the majority of developing countries, and some countries rely almost exclusively on remittances for foreign exchange. Unlike nearly all other types of capital flows, remittances respond primarily to the needs of families and not the profit-seeking motives of investors.
This article introduced the flow of remittances into the study of the political economy of exchange rate regimes and challenged the notion of financial market openness as an undifferentiated influence on economic policymaking. Prior scholarship views the free movement of capital as a constraint on policymakers that decreases the probability of selecting a fixed exchange rate. In contrast, this article has argued that remittances mitigate the costs of forgone domestic monetary policy autonomy and therefore increase the probability of choosing to fix the exchange rate. Several large-n empirical analyses presented in this article support this conclusion. As noted earlier, the newly available data on remittances from the World Bank have many drawbacks, most notably the fact that they only account for recorded flows. One should therefore assume that the empirical tests in this article are tentative, pending the availability of more accurate and comprehensive data on remittances.
The introductory section of this article alluded to the many policy areas in which remittances could have an important influence. For example, remittances could substitute for welfare-state spending by lessening the need for governmental subsidization of health care or government-sponsored employment programs. Governments that would otherwise feel compelled to insulate their citizens from the forces of the global economy-for example, by increasing the size of the government in line with Rodrik (1998) Remittances (%GDP)
Probability of Fixing
Note: Results based on Model 2. All other variables held at their means. Dotted lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Simulations conducted using CLARIFY (Tomz et al 2003) .
